

Logic matters to the historian of mathematics to the extent that it matters to her subjects, the mathematicians. Could it be otherwise? Logic has been a constant presence throughout the history of mathematics, at least since the times of Plato and Aristotle, though of course with significant changes in the intensity of its relations with mathematical practice. If the opinions of Descartes, e.g., mark a noteworthy low, the period 1880-1940 was probably the maximum of interaction ever attained – consider Hilbert. Thus the historian of mathematics is often confronted with the links between logic and mathematics, and those who work on periods such as the rise of modern twentieth-century mathematics can hardly avoid direct consideration of the issue (see among others J. Gray's book *Plato's Ghost*). Given the links between logic and computers, and also the recent surge of interest in automated proof, historians of the future will probably be faced with another high time of interrelations (articulated in quite a different way) in the period 1980-2020.

There have been hopes for a more direct involvement of logic with the historical reconstruction of relevant episodes in the past, but the reality is that most historians have not been involved in such attempts.

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